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In the Supre01e Court of the
State of Utah
I

\

JOHN S. IDAVIS d/b/a
GENEVA LUMBER COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
PAYNE AND DAY, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 9386

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff brought this action to recover $7,294.61 for
materials claimed to have been furnished to defendant on
the three count alternative theories of goods sold and de•
livered, quantum meruit, and open account. The first appeal was from an order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss at the close of the first trial. This court reversed,
and the case was tried a second time. This appeal is taken
from a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered at the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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elusion of the second trial and from an order overruling
defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant shall be
hereinafter referred to as appellant and plaintiff as respondent.
The appellant, Payne and Day, Inc., a Utah corpora-

tion, during the year 1957 contracted for the construction
of sixty-one homes in the Orem-Provo area for sale to interested buyers. The homes were built successively in five
different groups beginning with a group of ten homes in
Rose Garden Subdivision at Orem, and when that was
completed, the remaining four groups of homes were constructed in Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo. Appellant employed C. E. Slavens as construction superintendent under separate contracts covering each group of homes in
which his duties, authority, and compensation were specificaly defined, (Exhibits 20, 21, 22). The construction
superintendent procured bids from subcontractors on the
labor and materials necessary for the construction of each
home in each group, including respondent, and presented
the same to appellant. Appellant then attached the bid to
a written agreement with respondent, of which it was
made a part, providing for the furnishing of two packages of building materials in connection with each home
in each group of homes, (Exhibits 6 through 11). In these
contracts, the parties fixed a single unit home price and
appellant inserted in each the following provision:

•

"It is mutually agreed that any additions or deletions
in the materials to be furnished are to be given in
writing by party of second part (appellant) to the
first par.ty, and the value of the change, based upon
pri~ces quoted in the attached list, shall either be
added or subtracted from the original contract.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The parties entered into five separate .contracts on
the five groups of homes in question; the first is darted
February 21, 1957, and it covered ten homes in Rose Garden Subdivision, Orem, (Exhibit 6); the next is dated
March 16, 1957, and it covered eleven homes in Mount
Aire Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 10); the next was made
June 3, 1957, and it covered sixteen homes in Mount Aire
Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 8); the next is dated July
26, 1957, and it covered eleven homes in Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo, (Exhibit 7); and one dated September
3, 1957, covering twelve homes in the Mount Aire Subdivision, Provo, (E~hibit 9). There was also a contract
dated September 23, 1957, covering one home in the Western Manor Subdivision, Orem, (Exhibit 11). These contracts all incorporated respondent's bids for furnishing
all materials necessary for the construction of each home
unit through second and final F. H. A. inspections. With
the exception of the designation of the group of homes
covered, these ~contracts contained substantially identical
pr·ovisions, and for that reason we will refer to respondent's Exhibit 6 to illustrate the contract provisions.
Exhibit 6 covers the Rose Garden group of homes at
Orem. It provides that respondent shall fwnish materials for plan No. 485, schemes 1, 2, and 3, as per "attached
lists", which become a part of the agreement, "for the
price of $2,116.00". It required the specified grade and
quality indicated by the list and deliver-y within 15 days
after being ordered by the appellant. The attached lists
are entitled "Building Material List for Three Bedroom
House-Garage Plan with gabled front porch plan 485,
Package No. 1-Schemes 1, 2, 3." This list then specifies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in detail the numbe·r of units and the kind and quality of
materials necessary to complete the package and prices
out each unit and shows a package number 1 total net
priee of $1,610.00. Then follows a list similarly titled
for "package No. 2, schedules 1, 2, and 3," likewise detailing the materials and showing the net price for package No. 2 of $506.00. The contract then provides for the
above quoted writing in case there are any "additions or
deletions" in the list. It is further provided that materials shall be stacked on the job site in good order and in
accordanee with the supeTintendent's instructions; that
the contract priee shall hold for ninety days at which
time adjustments shall be made in accordance with current market prices; that appellant will purchase the material at the named price as needed; that payment for
materials delivQ.red is to be made on the 10t;h of the month
following delivery to the 27th of the preceding month;
"that delivery will be made and billed by package number as pe(I' attached list"; and the agreement covers the
ten houses in Rose Garden Subdivision. The houses described in this contract were built and the parties fully
performed their agreement.
On March 28 1957, respondent, Geneva Lumber Company, billed appellant for materials furnished as called
for in package No. 1 under the contmct, Exhibit 6, which
comprised the framing materials taking each house up
to second F. H. A. inspection. A receipt dated April 10,
1957, for $16,100 was thereupon given by respondent to
appellant a-cknowledging payment for the materials in
package No. 1, (E~hibit 12). Also, on April 10, 1957,
respondent executed and delivered to appellant a receipt
on each home unit described in E~hibit 6 for the sum of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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$1610.00 reciting that it was "In full payment for materials furnished" as required by package No. 1 of Exhibit 6. Likewise on April 27, 1957, respondent billed
app2Uant for materials furnished in package No. 2 on each
house unit described in Exhibit 6 and on May 10, 1957,
gave a separate receipt and lien waiver acknowledging
payment in full for each unit package No. 2 materials as
required by the contract, Exhibit 6, (Ex. 12; Tr. 132).
Identical contracts were made between these same parties
on each of the other groups of homes (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10,
and 11) pursuant to which respondent furnished the materials called for by package No. 1 and package No. 2 for
each unit and gave receipts in full on each home unit for
all materials furnished for same, as well as lien waivers
thereon. (E~hibits 13 A and B, 14 A, B, and C, 15 A, B,
and C, 16 A, B, C, and D).
TI\ree months after the date of the last contract (respondent's Exhibit 11) and after all of the contracts had
been fully performed, including those of C. E. Slavens, the
general superintendent, appeUant corporation received a
communication from Slavens (Exhibit 31) dated January 27, 1958, enclosing a statement from respondent for
"extras on the 73 homes" in the amount of $8398.30, and
which included documents in the nature of itemized statements, in which Slavens stated, "I need not say that the
entire bill is utterly ridiculous." Although the respondent
did not send this statement directly to the appellant, but
rather, sent same to Slavens, who was no longer employed
by appellant and was then in Blanding, Utah, and this was
the first notice appellant had been given that respondent
was making claim for extras under the contracts in question, (Tr. 487-488), respondent, John Davis, admitted that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he was well aware of the eontract provision (Tr. 421-423)
requiring a "writing if there were any additions or dele~
tions": and that he tried to get appellant on the telephone
for the purpose of procuring the writing but was un.able
to do so, (Tr. 410). He also admitted that no writing
was procured from the appel1ant authorizing any of the
additions of materials which he claims to have furnished.
Slavens denied that he ever told respondent that the required writing would not be necessary, (Tr. 567-570, 578580). Slavens did admit receiving, on or about July 1,
1957, a statement from respondent, (Exhibit 19) for
$623.36 tor extras on "Cherry Lane Project," (Tr. 571572), and that he talked to respondent, John Davis' wife,
and she told him it was sent out by mistake.
Respondent offered, as evidence of his claimed extras
allegedly furnished appellant in the construction of the
homes in question, three paper back books (E)cirlbits 1, 2,
and 3,) containing numerous undated entries of materials
claimed to have been furnished as "additions" to the lists
attached to the contracts, (Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11).
The tabs attached to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the red penciling and the crosses appearing therein were added by the
witnesses who identified same. Appellant made timely
objections to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and all oral evidence going to the idenrtifieation and explanation of same, and also
to respondent's Exhibits 4 and 5 (Tr. 70-90), summarizing the reasoning process employed by the witnesses, making conclusions from the entries in the three books as to
priees and materials. Appellant's objection to this evidence was made on the ground that its admission would
be a violation of the parol evidence rule in view of the
"additions and deletions" provision contained in the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tracts in question, and on the further ground tha:t the evidence was self-serving and immaterial, (Tr. 47-53). The
Court admitted this evidence despite appellant's objections.
Respondent used the date of the making of the contracts 6 through 11 respectively, to fix the time when the
alleged extras were furnished, and thus ties Exhibit 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 directly into the contracts mentioned, (Tr. 154158). Thus, the respondent dates the alleged delivery of
materials by reasoning that this nebulous mass must have
been furnished at the very time appellant was furnishing
materials under the above mentioned contracts, and in violation of the "additions" provision of the same.
Respondent elaimed that Slavens authorized the respondent to furnish the claimed extras appearing in Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, (Tr. 42-45; 84-86), but there is no evidence in the record that Slavens had any suoh authority,
either express or implied. Over our objection, the court
allowed the respondent to prove Slavens' authority by the
above-mentioned extra-judicial statements he was alleged
to have made to respondent.
The authority of Slavens to bind appellant is shown
by the eontracts under which he was employed. In fact,
appellant required a contract with each of the persons who
had any part in the eonstruction of the homes in question,
including the furnishing of materials. In each such case,
appellant protected itself as far as "additions and deletions"
were conce~rned by the above quoted contractual provision
appearing in each contract.
Appellant relies for a reversal of the trial court upon
the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
THE PAROL EVDENCE RULE IS APPLICABLE
AND THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ORAL EVIDENCE OF CLAIMED EXTRAS VIS-A-VIS THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION REQUIRING A WRITING IN
THE EVENT ADDITIONAL MATERIALS WERE
NEEDED.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED ORAL EXTRA- JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO
RESPONDENT BY SLAVENS, THE CONSTRUCTION
SUPERINTENDENT OF APPELLANT, GOING TO THE
EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF IllS AUTHORITY AS
AN AGENT.
POINT ill
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMI'ITING EVIDENCE
(1) THAT APPELLANT HlAD IN CONNECTION WITH
A CO'NTRAcr NOT IN ISSUE OR BEFORE THE COURT
IN THE INSTANT CASE PAID FOR ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FURNISHED, THOUGH NOT AUTHORIZED
IN WRITING, AND (2) ALSO ORAL AND WRI'ITEN
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS PERTAINING TO
AN ACCOUNT THERETOFORE ACKNOWLEDGED TO
HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUIDGSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MENT, FINDING AND HOLDING THAT APPELLANT'S
GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT HAD BOTH APPARENT AND ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE
PRO·VISIONS OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRING A
WRITING SIGNED BY APPELLANT FO·R EXTRA MATERIAL NOT CALLE.D FOR BY THE CO·NTRACT.
THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME.
POINT V
THE DOCTRINE OF THE "LAW OF THE CASE"
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE ·CO·URT FROM CONSIDERING APPELLANT'S POINTS MADE HEREIN DESPITE THE ADVERSE HO·LDING ON THE FIRST APPEAL.

THE BASIC ISSUE

Appellant, Payne and Day Inc., is a Utah corporation
wholly owned by Afton M. Payne and Henry Day, who supplied capital for the construction business, but who did
not participate actively in its building program. The 61
homes in question were constructed under contracts with
several individuals, including respondent, who contracted
to furnish the necessary materials (Exhibits 6 through 11).
There was also a separate contract with Slavens to supervise the construction work and act as construction superintendent. Thus appellant, having contractually established
its costs foT the construction of each of the homes in question, proceeded with its business venture. Appellant covenanted with respondent, in order to stabilize and eontrol
its costs so established, that written authority for "additions'' should be procured from its owners. Hence the
above quoted provision. In this regard, Slavens' contract
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was significantly silent and respondent's was explicit. Appellant complains bitterly that this protective provision was
held for naught on the admission in evidence over objection
of the extra-judicial statements of Slavens that he had au-

1Jhor1ty to \vaive the said provision.

We believe appellant

had a legal right to the protection of rthe provision in question and that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence.

Although respondent claimed a bill of more tha11

$7,000.00 in extras, allegedly incurred over rthe period of

the entire construction of the 61 homes in question, no
demand was made rto appellant for written authority to
furnish such extras, despite the aforesaid 1contract provision.

And as each of the contracts were performed (Ex-

hibit 6-11), respondent billed appellant as required thereby ,and was paid for all materials furnished, and gave receipts and lien waivers on each of the houses in question.
But no mention was made to appellant that any extras
were claimed by respondent until three months after the
performance of the last contract.

Appellant complains

that respondent and Slavens, in effect, were allowed by
the trial court to bypass, by a secret conspiracy, the crucial contract provision appellant's owners had placed in
the contracts for irts protection.

Certainly, appellant had

a right to rely on the contractual provisions, and it complains that the C·ourt bypassed and ignored the same in
aw·arding judgmenrt to respondent.
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THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PAROL EVDENCE RULE IS APPLICABLE
AND· THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ORAL EVIDENC'E O·F CLAIMED EXTRAS VIS-A-VIS THE CONTRACTUAL PRO·VISION REQUIRING A WRITING IN
THE EVENT AD·D~ITIONAL MATERIALS WERE
NEEDED.

It is obvious that the provision with respect to additional material bing required to be in writing is a contractual provision of ·the written contracts in question.
There is no evidence that there was ever any written authority given by the appellant to respondent to furnish
any ex-Was as claimed by respondent. Under these circumstances the respondent is barred from offering parol
testimony that he furnished additional materials under
the contract without producing a writing signed by appellant which -complies with the terms of the said provision of the contract. The trial court refused to apply the
parol evidence rule although it is firmly established in
Utah la\v. Of the parol evidence rule, this Court in Garrett v. Ellison (1937) 98 Utah 184, 72 P 2d 449, 129 A.
L. R. 669, has the following to say:
" . . . . The rule, so called, may be stated thus. Parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary, alter, control, or
contradict the terms of a written instrument, in an
action founded upon such writing, between the parties or privies thereto . . . . and the rule only applies to those elements or parts of the writing which
are contractual between the parties and not merely
recitals of fact . . . a rule has been established that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an agreement by parol which is collateral to the
written contreot and on a distinct subject may be
proved. To lay down, in advance, a distinct formula
that will determine by "rule of thumb" what cases
come within it, is difficult . . . the rule is founded
upon the principle that when the parties have discussed
and agreed upon their obligations to each other, and
reduced those terms to writing, that such terms, if
elear and unambiguous, furnish better and more definite evidence of what was undertaken by each party than the too often fickle memory of man, or why
else reduce it to writing. The rule applies to exclude
extrinsic utterances, when it is sought to use those
uttemnces for the purpose for which the writing was
made and have superseded them as the legal act."
See also Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. et al v.
Harsh Utah Corporation (1956) 5 Utah 2d 244; Fullmer
et al v. Morrill et eux. (1954) 2 Urtah 2d 347; 3 Jones
Comn1entaries on Evidence, Sec. 1484.

Again \Ve point out that appellant corporation was
in a large building enterprise and the corporate officers
did not have direct supervision of the work. For that
resaon it employed a construction superintendent and gave
him supervisory authority only. Appellant also made separate !Contract with all the other subcontractors who participated in any way in the construction, among which respondent had the written conrtracts for furnishing materi·als under the package method of contracting. Appellant had a right to protect itself from claims for extras
and did so by inserting in each contmct the provision with
respect to furnishing additional materials. Commenting
upon this phase of the application of the parol evidence
rule, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jenkins Used Cars
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vs. James G. Rice (1958) 7 Utah 2d, 276, 277, 323 P. 2d
259:
"But it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their
clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as signatories
thereto. WeTe this nort so, business one with another
among our citizens, would be relegated to the chaotic,
and the basic purpose otf the law, to supply enforceable rules of conduct for the ~maintenance and improvement of an orderly society's welfare and progress,
would find itself impotent. It is nort unreasonable to
hold one responsible for language which he himself
espouses. Such language is the only implement he
gives us to fashion a determination as to the intentions of the parties. Under such circumsttances we
should not be required to embosom any request that
we ignore that very language. This is as it should
be. The rule excluding matters outside the four corners of a elear, understandable document, is a fair
one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should
extend no further than his own clear e~pressions.''
We do not think respondent can arrange with anyone
to circumvent such written provision requiring written
authority for the furnishing of any extras, rely upon the
contracts, r2eeive payment and receipt in full for materials furnished under same, and then, after complete performance, for the first time, make these surprise claims
of extras that had been furnished. We believe thart it was
prejudicial error for the trial court to permit oral evidence
which varied the terms of the written contractual provision inserted in the contract for the protection of the officers and owners of appellant corporation.
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POINT IT
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN EVIDEN~CE THE ALLEGED OJ{.AL EXTRA- JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO
RESPONDENT BY SLAVENS, THE CONSTRUCTION
SUPERINTENDENT OF APPELLANT, GOING TO THE
EXISTEN~CE AND EXTENT OF HIS AUTHORITY AS
AN AGENT.
The trial court permitted respondent's evidence of alleged oral extra-judicial statements of S1avens that he had
authority to waive the aforesaid "additions and deletions"
provisions of ·the conrtract~ in question. Such evidence
is the sole basis for holding that appellant waived the
contractual provisions in question. Respondent claimed
that these oral statements were made by Slavens at Geneva's office in July of 1957; and that they were to the
effect that respondent oould keep a separate record of
the claimed extras and that same would be kept secret
from appellant. It was claimed that this amounted to
· rsepondent and appellant entering into an oral agreement
to waive the writing requirement provision for extras contained in the said contracts. T<his is the evidence allowed
by the Court. We submit that the construction superintendent's contract with appellant must be viewed in the
light of the contractual provision in respondent's contracts requiring the writing in the event additional mat~
rials are required. Clearly this limi~ts the construction
superintendent's authority to supervision of the conso--uction work, and any oral statement which he might make
to respondent, who was a party to the contracts in question, could not possibly be construed to be binding upon
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appellant. An agent's authority cannot be shown by reliance on oral declarations the alleged agent is supposed
to have made. The applicable rule of law in this regard
is stated in A. L. I. Restatement: Agency 2d, Section
285, beginning page 5, as follows:
"Evidence of a statement by an agent concerning the
existence or extent of his authority is not admissible
against he priincipal to prove its existence or extent,
unless it appears by other evidence that the making
of such statement was within the authority of the
agent or , as to persons dealing with the agent, within the apparent authority or other power of rtJhe
agent.''
'fhe following comments are made beginning page 5
under the above quoted rule as follows:
"a. The rule stated in this seotion does not deal with
testimony by an agent . . ."
"d. . . . On the orther hand, unless it is proved that
the speaker was an agent and that the statement
was within his power as such agent, evidence of the
statement is inadmissible . . .''
See also 2 American Jurisprudence, Section 445; and
3 A.L.R. 2d 602, where it is said:
''In cases too numerous to be exhaustively collected,
the proposition has been announced that, as against
the principal, evidence of extra-judicial statements
of an alleged agent is not admissible to show the
facts of agency or the extent or scope thereof.''
In A. L. I. Restatement: Agency, 2d, Section 8, apparent authority is defined as follows:
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''Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal
relations of another person by transactions with third
person, professedly as agent for the other, arising
from and in accordance with the others manifestations to such a third person.''
The following cor.ament on the foregoing rule as to
apparent authority is made beginning, Ibid., on page 30
as follows:
"a. Apparent authority results from a manifestation
by a person that another is his agent, the manifestation being made to a third person, and not, as when
authority is created, to the agent. It is entirely ditinct from authority, either express or implied . . . "
"c. Belief by a third person. Apparent authority exists only to tlhe eJ\.'tent that it is reasonable for the
third person dealing with tlle agent to believe that
the agent is authorized. Further, the third person
n1ust believe the agent to be authorized. In this respect apparent authority differs from authority, since
an agent who is authorized can bind the principal to
the transaction with a third person who does not
believe the agent to be authorized."
This Court stated in its opinion on the first appeal,
Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc.. 10 Ut. 2d 53, 56, that "It
is a \Veil established rule of law that parties to a written
contract may modify, waive, or make ne\v terms notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such
freedom." We recognize this rule of law but contend that
under the evidence in the instant case, in both the first
and second trials, it has no application. In support of this
rule, the opinion cites the case of Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell
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Estate Corp., 81 Utah 111, 16 P. 2d 923, and comments
on it ibid 57 as follows:
"The facts are similar to those in Salzner v. Jos. J.
Snell Estate Corp., wherein this court held that requirement in a written agreement that no alteration
should be made in the written order of the architect
containing ,the amount to be paid for such alteration
did not preclude a recovery for alterations made on
new plans and specifications not contemplated in the
original agreement although the alterations were on
the same building which was the subject of the written agreement, because the parties actually entered
into a new agreement and the defendant was therefore liable for the work and materials it received from
the plaintiff in that action."
We do not agree that the facts of the instant case
are similar to those of the Snell case; in faot, we would
like to point out that they are entirely different.
In the Snell case there was an agreement between
plaintiff and defendant whereby the plaintiff contractor
agreed to remodel a building in Salt Lake City. The work
was to be done under the direction of the defendant's architect, whose decision was to be final as to the meaning
of the plans and specifications. 'f,he contract provided that
additional drawings and specifications, if necessary, to illustrate the work were to be furnished by the architect.
There was a provision in the contract that "no alterations
shall be made in the work except upon written order of
the architect; . . . " Plaintiff contractor recovered a judgment for "alterations" from the original plans and defendant claime the archiect's writing had not been procured.
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":Dhe Court states in the Pacific Report, page 925, as follows:
"The work was done under the direction of the defendant's architect; the manager of the defendant company visited the building frequently as the work progressed and was familiar with the alte~ations that
were being made and made no objection whatever to
the work as it was done. The architect testified that
he issued a final certificate to the plaintiff that theTe
was due him for extra work the sum of $1757.80 in
whtch was included the amount of $1111.00 for the
extra work at the front of the building; that the alterations were made under his supervision; and that
he made a new sketch for the front in which were embodied the suggestions of the building inspector, and
as he recollected it, he received the instructions to
proceed from Mr. Snell, the manager of the defendant, and the certificate whieh he issued covered this
extra work on the front as well as other extras."
Obviously, the defendant corporate owner had agreed
with the plaintiff contractor in the written contract that
the order for the extras must be upon its architect's writing and this is what was done. The situation in the instant case is wholly different in that the appellant. Payne
and Day, Inc., agreed in writing with respondent, not that
its superintendent could waive the provision requiring a
writing in the event additional materials \Yere furnished,
but that the \vriting was to be furnished by the appellant,
and no request was ever made of and no such writing was
ever given by the appellant. In the Snell case, the defendant's architect changed the plans ·and specifications to
meet the requirements of the building inspector of Salt
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Lal{e City. The extras that had to be done were not,
therefore, included in the original contract, and the cotJrt
so held. The extra work was in effect a new contract between plaintiff and defendant to which the defendant
agreed and in fact, his anchitect drew the plans for the
extra work. In the Snell case the corporate O\vner contracted ~that this whole business should be handled by its
manager and the crucial provision was the extras should
only be paid for upon written order of its architect.
Whereas, in the instant case the appellant, to protect itself, limited the authority of its construction superintendent to supervision of the work, and contracted with respondent that in the event additional materials were required that it should be only upon the written authority
of appellant. Such a provision was erucial to ihe protection of the corporation with respect to "additions" or extras, and a great injustice to the owners and officers of
appellant will result if the trial eourt's ruling that the
contractual provision in question is to be circumvented and
ignored, is allowed to stand.
Under these authorities, the alleged statements of Slavens were inadmissible as they did not constitute a representation by the appellant to the respondent that the
claimed authority existed, and the Court erred in allowing such evidence to come in.
Rather than there being a representation from appellant that Slavens had authority to waive the eontractual
provisions in question by reason of the alleged oral statements, the respondent should have been estopped to assert that such statements were made. Respondent at all
times during the performance of the contracts in question relied upon them, billed appellant at the conclusion
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of each, and was paid according to the billing and receipted
appellant for full payment of all of the materials furnished rmder all of the contracts. Respondent seems to
have conspired with Slavens to keep secret what was go-

ing on between respondent and Slavens concerning the
claimed extras all during the period of February, 1957,
until November, 1957, when all of these contracts were
being perlormed, then some three months later claimed
that he had furnished extras despite the "additions and
deletions'' provisions of the said contracts.
POINT ill
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
(1) THAT APPELLANT HAD IN CONNECTION WITH
A CONTRACT NOT IN ISSUE OR BEFORE THE COURT
IN THE INSTANT CASE PAID FOR ADDITIONAL MATERI_t\.LS FURNISHED, THOUGH NOT AUTHORIZED
IN WRITING, AND (2) ALSO, ORAL AND' WRfi.I'EN
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS PERTAINING TO
AN ACCO·UNT TI-IERETOFORE ACKNOWLEDGED TO
I-IAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL.
(1) The Court admitted evidence over appellant's
objection to the effect that respondent had been paid for
additional materials furnished under roofing contracts on
some of the same houses contemplated by the instant suit,
although appellant did not authorize these extra roofing
materi·als in writing, as required by the roofing contract.
These roofing contracts were not the subject of the instant suit, and no elaim was made by respondent for extras with respect thereto in the case at bar. There was
no showing that the circumstances were the same or what
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the circumstances were, under which the claimed payments on the roofing contracts were made. The argument seems to be that if appellant waived the provision
in question in some other contract not before the Court,
that he did so in eonnection with the same provision in the
contracts in question. We do not believe that there is
any rule of evidence which permits or allows such speculative proof.
Also, over the objection of appellant the Court
admitted in evidence an alleged open account for materials clai~med to have been delivered to appellant by respondent, during the period o[ the construction of the
houses in question (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 19). These exhibits did not eonstitute any part of the system of accounts
regularly kept by respondent in his business. They are
paper baek books, including entries of items which are
supposed to be extras delivered to appellant in connection
with the performance of the contracts, (E~hibits 6 through
11), and for the most part they were undated and in different handwriting. They were kept as a result of the
above-mentioned secret oral conversations respondent
claims to have had with Slavens, and appellant was never
notified of their existence until three months after the last
of the 61 houses was constructed and respondent began
to assert his clai·rns for extras involved in the instant suit.
Our position is that these are self-serving declarations
which were erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial
court.
(2)

The law with respect to self-serving declarations is
stated in 20 American Jurisprudence Section 558, beginning at page 470:
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"There is a general rule that self-serving declarations,
defined as statements favorable to the interest of the
declarant, are not admissible in evidence as proof of
the facts asserted, whether they arose by implication
fron1 acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced
to writing. The vital objection to the admission of
this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthemore, such declarations are untrustworthy; to pern1it their introduction in evidence would open the door
to frauds and perjuries . . ."
See also Engemann v. Colonial Trust Company, etc.

(1954) 378 Pa. 92, 105 A. 2d 347, 48 A.L.R. 2d 858, at 863;
Stanton v. Stanton (1957) 213 Ga. 545, 100 SE 2d 289, 66
A.L.R. 2d 1401 at 1409; 2 Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Edition), Section 895 pages 1636-37, and Section 896 page 1640; Salt Lake City Brewing Company v.
Hawke et al, 44 Utah 199 at 208, 66 Pac. 1058.
It was pre,judicial error for the Court to admist such
evidence.
POINT IV
THE CO,URT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIO,NS O~F LA\V AND JlJ1DGMENT, FINDING AND HOLDING THAT APPELLANT'S
GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT HAD BOTIIi APPARENT AND ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO WAIVE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRING A
WRITING SIGNED BY APPELLANT FOR EXTRA MATERIAL NOT CALLE.D FOR BY THE CONTRACT.
THERE BEING NO· EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAME.
It is our poition that Slavens' contract as construction superintendent and the provision as to "additions and
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deletions" in the contracts with respondent precludes finding any apparent authority or actual authority in Slavens
rto waive the extra provision in question. Respondent reHes upon statements \Vhich Slavens is supposed to have
made, but which he denied making, to respondent at his
office. Respondent admits ·that he knew of the "additions
and deletions" provision of the contract, but that the most
he did to procure the wrirtrten authority of appellant was
to make an attempt to call appellant by phone, which was
unsuccessful. We have shown above that these state1nents
were not admissible and that it was error for the Court
to receive same in evidence.
The record shows that appellant hired Slavens under
a vvritten contract to supervise the construction of the
building project. In all of the contracts made by appellant
for the labor and materials that went into the construction, it provided that a writing was required in the event
there were "additions or deletions" needed. Although respondent well knew of this provision, he proceeded in the
teeth of it to secretly make some claimed deal about extras with Slavens in which Slavens is .alleged to have made
the alleged statement about his authority. The farthest
respondent seems to have gone to procure the required
writing, according to his own testimony, was to make an
attempt to get in touch with appellant, which he never
really accomplished.
Exhibit 19, dated July 1, 1957, was never sent to appellant, and no such claim was ever disclosed to appellant
during construction. All of the contracts in question made
it clear to Slavens and the respondent, as well as all of the
subcontractors, that if any ertra material or labor were
needed, authority to put them into the project had to be
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procured fron1 appellant in writing. This is not a case
where appellant's construction superintendent was making representation about his authority to some third party to procure materials. The most that can be made out
of respondent's claim is, if the same were taken to be true,
that he secretly furnished Slavens ~materials which he calls
extras without ever contacting appellant at any time during the existence of the contracts in question. However,
respondent relied upon and tied his claimed extras into each
one of the contracts in question, accepting payments and
receiving same in full, and several months after such completed performance, he asserts a claim for extras. Significantly, he did not send the claim to appellant, but
rather mailed it to Slavens, who had completed his contract
and was working in Blanding, Utah. Respondent wants
us to believe that appellatJ.t indulged in some conduct from
which it can be inferred that Slavens had actual or apparent authority to do what respondent claims he did. We
submit that the statements made by Slavens in his letter
of January 27, 1958, attached to E'xhibit 31, correctly refleets the situation when he said, "I need not say that the
entire bill is utterly ridiculous''. It is our position that the
trial court erred in admitting the extra- judicial oral declarations of an agent whose authority \Vas limited by all
of t,he contracts in question, and findings and Judgment
based on such evidence should be reversed.
The authorities eited w1der Point IT supra are again
cited under this point. Also, we call attention to Hilyar
v. Union Ice Cotlnpany (Cal. 1955) 286 P. 2d 21, at page
28, involving a statement by the agent that he was "employed" by the principal where the Court observed as follmvs:
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"In the case at bar, the uncontradicted facts show a
wholesaler-retailer relationship. The only evidence to
the contrary is Ingram's statement to the officer that
he was "employed" by the Union Ice Company. In
Fesler v. Rawlins, 43 Cal. App. 2d 541, 544, 111 P. 2
380, 382, it was said: "It is axiomatic that agency
cannot be established by the declarations of the agent
not under oath or in the presence of the principal.
As stated in 1 Cal. Jur. 698, 'if the rule were otherwise any rogue ~could use the name of an honest man
to facilitate his roguery'." See, also, Mechem Outlines Agency, 3d Ed., Para. 112, p. 68."
Also in Brownell v. Tidewater Associated Oil Company (1941) 121 F. 2d 239 beginning at the bottom of
page 243, the Court had the following to say on the matter of the agent's extra-judicial declarations as proving
agency:
"The trial judge stated that he was satisfied that there
was no authority in any of the employees to make any
agreement to enter into the contract which the plaintiffs claim was made. We agree. There was no evidence of any sort given to establish the actual authority of Mr. Whelan except his own alleged statement that he had such authority. It is, of course,
well settled, as the judge ruled at the trial, that agency ,and authority cannot be proved by the hearsay
statements of the alleged agent himself. Orvis v.
George, 5 Cir., 47 F. 2d 1045, 1931; E. A. Strout
Farm Agency v. Hosford, 81 N. H. 507, 128 A. 685,
1925; Bohanan v. Boston & Maine R. R., 70 N. H.
526, 49 A. 103, 1901; Am. L. Inst. Restatement of
Agency Para. 285. There was no competent evidence
to submit to the jury proving that Mr. Whelan had
any actual authority to make a binding agreement
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to enter into a commission agency agreement with
the plaintiffs.''
The same Court then went on to say as to apparent
authority the following:
"Nor do we believe that there was sufficient evidence
to justify a jury in finding that Mr. Whelan had apparent authority to enter into the alleged agreement.
The actions of the principal and the knowledge of a
reasonable man in the position of the ~third person are
the important factors in establishing apparent authority. The New Hampshire court has defined apparent authority as "that authority which a reasonably prudent man, induced by the principal's acts and
conduct, in the exercise of reasonable diligence and
sound discretion, under similar circumstances, with the
party dealing with the agent, and \vith like knowledge, would naturally suppose the agent to have".
Atto v. Saunders, 77 N. H. 527, 529, 93 A. 1037,
1039, 1915. ln Davison v. Parks, 79 N. H. 262, 263,
108 A. 288, 289, 1919, the court said that in order
to find aparent authority it \Vas necessary to show
"that the principal has either so conducted his business as to give third parties the right to believe that
the act in question is one he has allthorized his agent
to do, or that it is one agents in that line of business
are accustomed to do". Cf. Sullivan v. John H·ancock
Mutual Lif..e lnsurance Co., 86 N.H. 184. 165 A. 277,
1933. We do not believe that the plaintiffs have come
w lthin these rules.''
We conclude that there is no valid evidence to support the findings and judgment entered by the trial court
and therefore same should be reversed and set aside.
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POINT V
THE DOCTRINE OF THE "LAW OF THE CASE"
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE COURT FROM CO·NSIDERING APPELLANT'S POINTS MADE HEREIN DESPITE THE ADVERSE HO·UDING ON THE FIRST APPEAL.
At the conclusion of the first trial of the instant case
on motion of defendant, Payne and Day, Inc., the trial
court made an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. No
findings were made as provided by 41 (b) U. R. C. P.
Plaintifif appealed from the order of dismissal. The only
issue before this Court on its first appeal was "Did plaintiff's evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to him, show ·that he was entitled to relief?" The
Court then reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and held that the "Oourt could reasonably have found" for the plaintiff. There was no evidence
in the record adduced by the defendant, and the only evidence considered was that of plaintiff. No issues of law
were raised by the appeal other than a eonsideration of
the evidence in the most favorable light to the plaintiff.
The Court's function on the first appeal, therefore, was
a consideration of the facts found in the record, which the
Court was compelled to construe in favor of plaintiff.
The "law of the case" doctrine is stated in 3 American Jurisprudence, Section 985, beginning page 541 as follows:
" .. The decisions agree that as a general rule, when
an appellate court passes upon a question and remands
the cause for further proceedings, the question there
settled becomes the "law of the case" upon a subseSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quent appeal, provided the same facts and issues which
were determined in the previous appeal are involved
in the second appeal. But if the facts are different,
so that the principles of law announced on the first
appeal are not applicable, as where there are material changes in the evidence, pleadings or findings, a
prior decision is not conclusive upon questions presented on the subsequent appeal; . . .''
See also ibid., Section 1000, page 553.
The Utah law is in accord with the foregoing general
rule. In Petty v. Clark (1948) 113 Ut. 205, 192 P. 2d 589,
our Supreme Court recognized the general rule but refused
to apply the "law of the ease" doctrine where the issues
were different on the second appeal. In the first trial the
jury found in favor of the defendant and the trial court
disregarded the jury's findings and held for the plaintiff.
On fi:tst appeal, the case was reversed on the grounds that
the issues were legal and not equitable, and therefore the
court was bound by the findings. The case was remanded
for a new trial, and the legislature pased an amendment
bet\veen the two trials making the findings of the jw--y in
such a case advisory only. At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury again found i1·1 favor of the defendant
and so did the judge who tried the case the second time.
On the second appeal. this Court refused to apply the doctrine of the "law of the case" because that "doctrine [does
not] require us to adhere to our former decision on this
question." The reason assigned was that the amendment
made by the Legislature between the two trials changed
the "poHcy of the law" and that the change was procedural only and not substantive. It would seem that the
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Court meant by this that the issues considered in the first
appeal had been changed by the amendment when it came
before the Court on the second appeal.
We submit that in the instant case the issues in the
second appeal are different from the single issue considered on the first appeal. There the only issue was considering the plaintiff's evidence and indicating what favorable findings might have been reasonably made for plaintiff; whereas, in the second appeal, the evidence of both
the plaintiff and defendant were in the record to be
weighed and considered in the light of same having been
admitted over the objections of the parties. Serious issues of law are raised by defendant's insistence upon the
parol evidence rule and that the extra-judicial oral statements of an agent are not binding on his principal under
the facts of this case, the trial court having overruled and
deined defendant's objection in this regard. Also, this appeal presents the issue of law as to the alleged agent's apparent authority, which the trial court fiound to exist over
appellant's objection and without any foundation in the evidence. Also, we now raise on this appeal the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and judgment that the agent had either real or apparent authority to waive the provision of the contracts requiring that appellant would not be bound for "additions" (extras) unless respondent procured a writing. We submit that
tmder these circumstances, the first appeal did not determine the major issues which are before this Court on the
second appeal, and therefore the "law of the case" doctrine
does not apply here.
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CONCLUSION

Because the trial court erred in (1) allowing in evi-.
dence extra-judicial statements of the appellant's construction superintendent, Slavens, the effect of which was to
extend his authority, (2) allowing in evidence ornl and
written statements which varied the "additions and deletions'' pro~sion of the contracts in question in violation
of the parol evidence rule, (3) admitting incompetent and

self-serving ,evidence, both written and oral, of the account
for additions or extras where no compliance with the terms
of the written contract were shown, and (4) by making
and ente,ring findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment based upon evidence erroneously admitted at the trial, we eonclude that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed and the case should be remanded to the trial
court with directions that same be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALLIF
GEORGE E. BALLIF
For BALLIF AND BALLIF

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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